CURRENT PROBLEMS AFFECTING COSTS OF
CONDEMNATIONt
DAVID BERGER*

Urban blight is neither a problem of recent origin nor one which is confined tothe United States. With very few exceptions (notably Billy Penn's "greene countrytown" of Philadelphia), our cities developed uncontrolled and untrammeled by
plan. Especially was this true during the nineteenth century, when cities burgeoned'
to accommodate and house the expanding economy wrought by the Industrial
Revolution. The expansion carried within it the seeds of the twentieth century
physical deterioration of our urban centers. As the industrial complex grew to meet.
the war demands of the 194o's and the frustrated consumer needs of the 1950's, blight
began to threaten the very existence of our cities. However, it is not true, as somebelieve, that society stood idly by while this urban cancer developed.
Society's initial attempts to eradicate urban blight were, indeed, as old as its very
existence. The common law of public and private nuisances has been and continues.
to be antipathetic to deteriorating land usage. Of more recent origin, zoning control,
building codes, and federal public housing projects aimed at this target. Nevertheless,.
these piecemeal attempts proved futile in and of themselves to provide an effective
solution. The comprehensive power of government to renew, rehabilitate, and redevelop entire geographical areas within its jurisdiction-complementing effective
programs of zoning regulation, building code enforcement, slum clearance, and.
public housing-was exercised to restore our cities and to prevent further blight.
This, then, is the sum of today's tools for effective urban renewal.
Necessarily, comprehensive urban renewal .has brought to the fore many new
problems both within and without the compass of law. However, some problems.
are neither new nor peculiar to it alone. Rather, they are encountered at all levels
of government and whether or not the concern is urban renewal. One of the latter,.
the cost attendant to the exercise of the power of eminent domain, is the general,
subject of this section. Here, the concern is not only how much government will
be required to pay when it takes land or property by its sovereign right or pursuant
to constitutional or legislative grant, but also the indirect costs that are levied upon
government when it operates through traditional condemnation procedures. And
it is of relatively minor significance whether the purpose of the taking be for a highway, slum clearance, public housing, industrial development, airport construction, or
any other type of project. The question of cost is ever present.
"lThe author gratefully acknowledges the devoted and highly intelligent assistance of Deputy to theCity Solicitor Lewis Kates in the preparation of this article.
* A.B. 1932, LL.B. 1936, University of Pennsylvania. Member of the Pennsylvania bar. City Solicitorof Philadclphia.
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Implementation of the power to condemn has been, at most, incompletely prescribed by the legislature, despite the fact that nonconsensual property acquisition is
one major instance in our society where the private individual is necessarily subservient to the general interest. The property owner has, at best, a limited right
to question the general exercise of government prerogative; a more liberal, but never-

theless restricted, right to question the particular taking; and a general right only
to question the amount of compensation to be paid for the taking. Inept though it

may be at times, the judicial branch of the government has carried the burden of
providing a forum in which the individual voice can most effectively be heard
It
has had to mold a flexible body of law and procedure to resolve the ever-changing
social problems with which condemnation is concerned. This responsibility and
its assumption have been well delineated by Judge Roger A. Traynor, as follows '2
More than ever social problems find their solution in legislation. Endless problems
remain, however, which the courts must resolve without benefit of legislation. The great
mass of cases are decided within the confines of stare decisis. Yet there is a steady evolution, for it is not quite true that there is nothing new under the sun; rarely is a case identical with the ones that went before. Courts have a creative job to do when they find
that a rule has lost its touch with reality and should be abandoned or reformulated to
meet new conditions and new moral values. And in those cases where there is no stare
decisis to cast its light or shadow, the courts must hammer out new rules that will respect
whatever values of the past have survived the tests of reason and experience and anticipate
what contemporary values will best meet those tests. The task is not easy-human relations are infinitely complex, and subtlety and depth of spirit must enter into their regulation. Often legal problems elude any final solution, and courts then can do no more than
find what Cardozo called the least erroneous answers to insoluble problems.
It seems self-evident that blind criticism of existing judicial practices and procedures in this field would be unfair and unworthy of the universally recognized
desire of the courts to cope with the problem effectively and justly. A particular
solution, unjust in itself, may perhaps prove to be the most equitable solution that
can be brought about by judicial action alone. Indeed, without corrective legislation
or constitutional amendment, even rudimentary justice may be impossible of attainment.

At any event, in considering costs of condemnation, two areas will be explored
here. The first is concerned with direct outlays to be paid by the condemning
authority. These comprise, among others, the cost of acquisition, interest on the
award, and the right to be reimbursed for legal fees. The second involves the
'It is, of course, true that the redevelopment laws passed by virtually every state provide for notice
and opportunity to be heard prior to the formulation of the plan of redevelopment. In most jurisdictions,
citizens and property owners have the additional right to appear before the legislative body of the city
or other governmental unit to express objections to the plan. However, it is obvious that only a judicial
arm can make the binding determination in the case of a contest over the amount of compensation which
should be paid to the individual property owner (which the great majority of the disagreements involve),
or can give effective redef in the event c- an unfavorable decision at a political or administrative level
with respect to the project itself.
'Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. ILL. L. F. 230, 232.
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indirect costs levied upon government through the utilization of either the traditional
condemnation or the more recently developed quick-taking procedure.

DiREcr Oum-.vs
There are several methods for judicially determining the proper amount of
compensation to be paid a landowner when property is taken for public purposes.
When the objective is total acquisition, resort is commonly made to either one of two
tests to determine the market value of property. The first centers on value of the
property for its "highest and best use" The other utilizes "replacement or repro-.
duction cost," where market value cannot be clearly ascertained. When the issue in
the litigation is severance damages arising from a taking of a portion of property
and not total acquisition, the "before and after value" test has almost universally
been applied.
It is obvious that some time must elapse between the actual taking and the receipt
of compensation, regardless of the criterion for determining value. Consequently,
many problems arise concerning what, if any, interest on the basic award should be

allowed. As a result of enabling legislation in a few jurisdictions, the court is
permitted to charge the condemnor with the property owner's attorneys fees--the
amount of which may, of course, give rise to controversy.

The presence of these and many other types of controversies substantially affects
the ability of a condemning authority to anticipate with any degree of certainty the
amount it will be called upon to pay. As a result, in numerous instances where
the cost of property acquisition is likely to be the determinative factor in the net
project cost, government is hampered and, indeed, ofttimes frustrated because it cannot ascertain the financial feasibility of a proposed project.
Left to their own resources, some courts have, when faced with these problems,
seemingly succumbed to pressures markedly inconsistent with both logic and public
welfare. The following analysis of some recent relevant decisions in these areas
highlights the judicial failure to achieve even, in the Cardozian phrase, "the least

erroneous answer to insoluble problems"
A. Highest and Best Use
The general principle is that proposed land uses which are higher and better
than those presently existing are a legitimate basis for evaluation, provided the use
is not too remote or speculative. However, the danger is obvious. Judicial recognition of anticipated use as a factor in determining damages opens the door to
exorbitant valuations by the "expert" witnesses. It does not follow that valuation

must, therefore, be restricted to a consideration of present use. In that instance, the
2See, e.g., F. STA*r. A.,. S 73.16, 74-10 (1943); N.C. Ge.. STAT. S z6o-456(q) (959 Cure.
Supp.). Cf. IT.. STAT. A.i.-. ch. 67 V2, S 188 (x959); MICI. COMP. L'WS S 213.89 (1948); MISS. Cool
ANN. ch. 3, S 2775 (1956). In the absence of specific legislation, the question arises as to whether the
court has equitable power to reimburse any of the property owner's legal expenses.
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cure would likely be more inequitable to the individual than the present system can
ever be to the condemning authority. But it does emphasize the duty on our
courts carefully to scrutinize proffered evidence on anticipatory uses. Unfortunately,
many courts have rejected this responsibility.
In Town of Slaughter v. Appleby,' suit was brought against certain landowners
to expropriate from them a right-of-way in order to construct a road and to install
gas and water lines across their land. The right-of-way traversed a 25o-acre plot
dividing it into two parcels, one of which contained thirteen acres and the other 237
acres. At the time of the taking, the land was used solely for grazing purposes.
However, at the trial, the property owners were permitted to present expert testimony
that the land in question could be utilized for home sites. Further, if it were so
utilized, its value would be about eight times the value in its present use. Even
though no evidence was presented showing a reasonable prospect that, absent condemnation, the land would have been used for this value-enhancing purpose, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana upheld an award based on development for homes."
A similar result was reached in Kentucky Department of Highways v. Wilson another instance in which a seemingly exorbitant award was upheld. The property
sought was seven acres of a thirty-seven acre tract. The lower court approved an
award valuing the acquired property at three times the value of the remaining thirtyacre tract. Furthermore, this disproportionate valuation did not include residential
improvements on the smaller tract. On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
upheld the award by reason of evidence that the land taken had a prospective commercial value, despite the fact that the prospects for its commercial utilization were
-entirelyremote.
In City of Wichita v. Fitch,6 the Supreme Court of Kansas also upheld a valuation
based upon a remote anticipated use. The property condemned was taken by the
City's Park Commission in order to provide a municipal beach and recreation area.
Prior to the condemnation, the owner had unsuccessfully attempted to have his land
rezoned in order to permit his own operation there of a park. Despite the prior
denial of rezoning, evidence of the tract's value as a recreation area was presented
at the subsequent condemnation proceeding and an award was made on this basis.
On appeal, the award was affirmed, the court noting that the inability of the prior
owner to gain a commercial zoning classification prerequisite for a private park was
not determinative since the municipality had itself condemned the land for use as a
park. The import of this decision seems to be that the use which the condemning
authority plans for the acquired property is properly to be considered in the condemnation proceeding, regardless of any actual prospect of private achievement of
this use. These cases represent the most liberal approach in permitting evidence of
remote anticipated uses to determine value. Other decisions range a broad spectrum
in so far as liberality to the property owner is concerned.
235 La. 324, 103 SO.2d 461 (1958).
SAV.2d 490 (Ky. x958);

S317

184 Kaff. 508, 337 P.2d 1034 (1959).
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An example is United States v. Jones Beach State Parkway Authority, decided

by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. State-owned land
adjoined a United States Air Force facility. At the time of condemnation, the land
was used as a landing approach by the adjacent air field pursuant to existing federal
casements. However, ownership in fee was deemed necessary. The base value of
the land, before any depreciation due to the easements, was higher in residential use
than it was in its use by the state for park purposes. However, the easements virtually
precluded residential use and made the land almost valueless for that purpose. But
the easements did not interfere so greatly with park use, and for that use the land
apparently retained considerable value. Thus, the condemning authority was in the
unusual position of favoring the land's highest and best use as the basis for an award,
since the cost of acquisition would be less by reason of the existing federal easements.
The court held that value of the land could not be based on its present use for park
purposes, because no evidence was introduced showing that this use was also the
highest and best use. Indeed, the state's own evidence of value disputed its contention
and supported the position of the condemning authority that the best use was
residential. The court ruled that since the easements had so completely depreciated
the land's value for this best use, the compensation now allowable to the state for
its land would be limited to the remaining value of the land for residentialpurposes.
In Re Omaha Public Power District8 is another decision similar in impact to

Jones Beach. The Omaha Public Power District sought to condemn an easement
for a transmission line. Only a corner of the land was to be traversed by the line,
and less than half an acre was to be taken for the Power District's right-of-way.
The trial court instructed the jury to consider any use to which the land was adapted,
and for which it might be used either then or later, having regard to what "may
reasonably be expected in the future:' On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nebraska
held this instruction constituted prejudicial error, since it failed to limit the future
uses which the jury could consider. According to the appellate court, "the time
element is an important one and it must be limited to the immediate future:*
In Southern Amusement Company v. United States,' the federal government

instituted condemnation proceedings against a tract of land contiguous to another
tract of land on which a drive-in theater was located. At the time of condemnation,
the two parcels-although under the same ownership-were not complementary to
each other either in existing or contemplated use. Nevertheless, at the trial, the
corporation which owned the property attempted to introduce evidence that as a
result of the condemnation, it would be unable in the future to enlarge the existing
drive-in theater so as to make it comparable in size to the norm in the trade. On
appeal, the trial court's refusal to admit the proffered evidence was challenged. The
court of appeals, in affirming, held that the proffered evidence was merely a specula.
255 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 958).
x68 Ncb. 12o, 95 N.W.2d 209 (1959).
'Id. at 124, 95 N.W.2d at 213.
l* 65 F.ad 34 ( 5 th Cir. 1959)-
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tive estimate of what the theater would bring on the open market if offered for sale
with the extra acreage-that acreage being the tract which was being condemnedin contrast to its value without the same acreage.
This case calls to mind the following hypothetical situation. Assume that condemnation is proposed of an urban tract of land zoned for single-family dwellings on
one-acre plots. The condemning authority proposes to utilize the tract, presently
lying fallow and undeveloped, for a public housing project in which high-rise
structures and attached housing will be built. The private owners had not, previous
to 'the condemnation proceeding, evidenced any intent to develop the land pursuant
to existing zoning, let alone develop it for attached dwellings or apartments after
appropriate action to obtain rezoning. Assume further that the tract is contiguous to
a fully-developed attached housing urban area, and that the purpose of zoning this
area for single-family residences, which includes the condemned tract, evidently was
to insure a high-quality future residential development. Then, should the owner be
permitted to present evidence that the highest and best use of the land would be
other than that presently permitted by the applicable zoning regulations?"1
No meaningful contention can be made that the private owner should be restricted to compensation commensurate with the instant land use-namely, undeveloped and fallow property without housing and without agricultural value because
of its size and location. Evidence of prospective use is clearly a proper matter to
consider in determining value; and condemning authorities, in cases like the hypothetical one, have considered prospective use in determining the value of the tract
with regard to the financial feasibility of the proposed project. But the question
remains-where is the proper line of demarcation for future uses?
Because the condemned tract is contiguous to a fully-developed urban area, its
potential residential use is properly considered. However, effective zoning restricts
its residential use to single-family dwellings on one-acre plots. It would be most
unlikely that the owner could obtain a requisite zoning variance enabling his potential
development of attached housing. The condemning authority, on the other hand,
proposes construction of this very type of housing; and its program will render it
more difficult for landowners to develop any nearby property consistent with the
existing single-family zoning classification. Consequently, in the future, it is more
probable that owners adjacent to the condemned property will succeed in obtaining
the requisite variances for construction of attached housing-and this, in turn, will
tend to increase the values of the adjacent lands.
Both the government and the individual are placed in anomalous positions. If
this is the only tract taken, other owners in the area will benefit by the resulting
increase in property values. However, if the tract is not taken and no other is substituted, neither this owner nor any other would reap such a benefit. In other words,
if the government should not construct this public housing at all, the owner has, at
"'Atfirst blush, this hypothetical case is similar to City of Wichita v. Fitch.

in that in the hypothetical case, no zoning had been requested or denied.

However, it differs
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best, a slight chance to gain approval of attached housing that will increase his land

values-so slight, in fact, that its remoteness is clear. Thus, solely by reason of
government action, the cost of condemnation would be increased if valuation were
based on this prospective, more valuable use.

It would not seem proper to impose a penalty upon the condemning authority for
government action laudable in purpose and beneficial to all. In such circumstances,
attached residences should not be a proper anticipatory use. The private owner,
nevertheless, obtains the full value to which he is entitled. The fact that other
property owners ultimately may benefit is immaterial, for they do not benefit at his
expense. Indeed, only if this owner can persuade the condemning authority to
choose another tract in this area instead of his, could he in any way expect to be the

recipient of this benefit. Therefore, the anticipatory use should be held too remote
as a matter of law.'
Using this analysis as a springboard, we may profitably return to the decisions
previously cited. In City of Wichita v. Fitch," the situation is much the same as
that in the hypothetical case. It seems clear that holding the future use not to be
remote is unjustifiable. Moreover, in Fitch, the private owner's application for a
requisite zoning variance had been denied.14 In Kentucky Department of Highways v. Wilson, 5 while the award was exorbitant and based on an erroneous determination that the prospective use was not remote, there was some evidence which
justified this use as a proper basis for valuation. Conversely, in Southern Amusement
Company v. United States,'8 the court may have unduly restricted the landowner.
At least from a mere reading of the court's opinion, it does seem that some of the
evidence which was offered but excluded was relevant to prove requisite intent to
make the highest and best use of the land condemned.
Very few opinions display that depth of analysis necessary for an orderly determination of whether a particular future use is remote. This is a fault which cannot
be cured by legislatures; it is for the judiciary to respond to the demand for thinking
in depth in order to solve this admittedly difficult problem. And once this judicial
responsibility is discharged, not only will the individual be assured that he will
receive his just due, but government will be more able to project with reasonable
certainty outlays needed in prospective projects.
"If a decision is to be made that a future use is too remote for proper consideration, the only effective
agency to assume this responsibility is the court itself. Remoteness must be decided by the judge as a
matter of law. To admit all evidence subject to a limiting jury restriction is futile.
"See note 6 supra.
'The only justification for the decision in Fitch that could be presented does not appear in the
reports. If the zoning request by the private owner had been denied because of the announced intention
of the condemning authority to take over the land, Fitch would stand on a better footing than the
hypothetical. This is so because the application for the variance would be some proof that the owner
had reasonable prospects for this anticipated use.
"' See note 5 supra.
"See note 1o supra.
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B. Interest on the Award
Commonly, appreciable delays occur between the time of the taking and the
payment of compensation. Most frequently delay is occasioned because the private
owner contests the amount of compensation due. But the right to question ex parte
property valuation by government is basic in our society. No penalty, therefore,
should be or is levied on the individual. Additional compensation is proper for the
resulting delay in receipt of compensation. Of course, further expense is levied upon
the condemning authority by reason of these interest charges. Indeed, protracted
litigation frequently results in substantial land cost increases, on which huge interest
payments must be made.
Legislative reaction to high condemnation costs, in part due to interest charges, has
occasioned widespread action. Some jurisdictions enacted comprehensive quicktaking procedures with depository provisions and thereby averted much of the interest payments theretofore extracted from government.1 7 Other jurisdictions have
more recently and more restrictively enacted depository provisions 1 8 Nevertheless,
many problems remain, although, perhaps, they are not quite so crucial.
In State v. Fisher,"' the New Jersey Highway Department had acquired a tract
of land in 1940 pursuant to an immediate-taking procedure. However, not until
1956 did the state institute condemnation proceedings. The initial award fixed compensation at a figure which "included therein use by the State.:2 An appeal was
taken by the landowners to compel the payment of interest on the award from the
date of the actual taking until commencement of condemnation proceedings. The
court, in denying relief, held that since the award included an amount for use by
the state, an award of interest would be improper because it would grant a double
allowance for the owners' deprivation.
Obviously, an award including both the value of the use of the property by the
condemning authority during the interim period and interest for the deprivation to
the private owner of the basic compensation award is, at least, double compensation.
However, that conclusion in no way serves as a justification for the result reached in
Fisher, for the court permitted an award seemingly commensurate with the value
of the governmental use of the property. Yet, the loss occurs to the owner. And the
loss is not in regard to the deprivation of his use of the property pending payment of
compensation, but rather is in regard to the delay in his receipt of the proper compensation. It, therefore, is a pure monetary investment loss. Indeed, consideration
of the value of the land use after the taking and pending payment to the ownerwhether use by the condemning authority or hypothesized use by the owner-is
totally irrelevant.
Most courts recognize the obvious propriety of considering solely the loss of
T

See, e.g., Federal Declaration of Taking Act, 46 Stat. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. 1 258 (1958).
S x8oor (Supp. x959).
*54 N.J. Super. 274, 148 A.2d 735 (1959).

"'See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN.

S°Id. at 279, 148 A.2d at 739.
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interest. In De Hruhl v. State Highway & Pub. Works Commission, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina declared that property owners are entitled to an award
including interest at the legal rate of six per cent from the date of the taking. 2
However, the impact of this rigid ruling leaves much to be desired. The legal rate,
being static, more often than not fails adequately to reflect the amount the individual
lost by not having available for investment an amount of money equivalent to
the basic value of the property taken. On the other hand, the commercial rate of
interest which prevailed at the time of the taking does seem truly reflective of the
loss. Of course, if it is utilized, an additional burden, that of computation, is placed
upon the court, but that factor should not be determinative.
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania may present a solution
of striking practicality. The state had condemned land for highway purposes; and
at the trial, it had requested a jury instruction that an award might be made on any
rate of interest and not necessarily the legal rate. The trial court denied this instruction, and an award was made containing interest at the legal rate of six per cent.
On appeal, it was-contended that the refusal of the lower court so to instruct the jury
was prejudicial error. The Supreme Court held that the legal rate of interest was
not the unalterable rule in condemnation awards and, further, that an award was
proper if based on the commercial rate of interest. However, there exists what
amounts to a presumption that the legal rate is proper, although any party can present evidence that an interest award should be made at another rate. Nevertheless,
the burden is on the proponent to prove that the legal rate is not reflective of true
loss. 4 As a result, unless an evidentiary contest arises, the court is unencumbered
in its determination of the proper interest on the basic award.
C. Severance Damages: Single Ownership of Two or More Parcels of Land
In principle, the measure of damages when only a portion of a single tract is condemned is the difference in its value before and after acquisition. However, often
the right to severance damages arises in the context of a question whether an owner
of two or more distinct tracts of land is entitled to compensation for damages to the
remaining property. Theoretically, if a unity of use exists between the two or more
parcels, the owner should be entitled to severance damages to the same extent that
he would if a portion of a single tract had been taken. Nevertheless, several recent
decisions on this issue reveal a lack of uniformity in judicial analysis. Moreover,
11247 N.C. 67z, 'o2 S.E.2d 229 (1958).
"'The Supreme Court 'of North Carolina, in Winston-Salem v. C. H. Wells, 249 N.C. 148, 105

S.E.2d 435 (z958), further clarified the right of a landowner to six per cent on the award from the
date of the taking.
"'Waugh v. Commonwealth, 394 Pa. 166, 146 Aad 297 (1958). In this decision, the court held
that the state did not present sufficient evidence to justify the jury's considering other than the legal rate.
"A further criticism common to Fisher and Waugh is that the award did not specifically determine
the amount of interest. Rather, there was a general award which included in" Waugh a legal rate of
interest and in Fisher no interest, but rather an amount commensurate with the state's use of the
property. No hardship will be caused by specific findings of the amount of the basic award and the
interest thereon.
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they portray ofttimes muddled thinking regarding what constitutes a unity of use
and who should make that determination.
In Ives v. Kansas Turnpike Atthority, the Kansas Supreme Court was presented
with the issue of whether severance damages were allowable to an owner of two rural
tracts of land lying one mile apart. The owners had used the two tracts as a unit for
more than seventeen years prior to the condemnation. But as a result of the taking
by the turnpike authority, unified use could no longer be continued. The court,
while acknowledging that the distance between the two tracts was an important
factor, held that even where two or more tracts of land under single ownership are
not contiguous or physically connected, they can, nevertheless, be considered as a
unit for the purpose of assessing damages, provided the uses to which the tracts have
been applied are so inseparably connected that the taking of a portion of one, in
fact, injures the other.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota" set forth different language as to what
constitutes a unity of use. Once again, both parcels of the land in question were
rural. The court held that noncontiguous tracts of land in single ownership constituted one distinct parcel of land for the purpose of assessing damages if both parcels
were subject to a coordinated and uniform use.
However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit seems to have imposed an
27
additional test to determine a unity of use. Cole Investment Co. v. United States
concerned two tracts of land, one of twenty acres and the other of one hundred acres,
the latter being the one condemned. On the smaller tract, the owners had dug a well,
laid some pipe, and installed a pump for the purpose of irrigating the other land.
The court, affirming the denial of severance damages with respect to the smaller tract,
held that there must have been, in fact, a unity of use of the land taken and the
land remaining and that the market value of the remaining land mist have diminished as a result of the condemnation. Here, since the well had not been completed
at the time of condemnation-although extensive construction had commenced and
costs therefor had been experienced-there was only a planned unity of use. Further, since the owner had not presented evidence of a decrease in market value, but
only loss of business opportunity, he had not sustained his burden.
This decision is, of course, distinguishable from both the Kansas Turnpike
Authority and the State Highway Commission cases. In Cole Investment Co., the
court was concerned with a use which at the time of condemnation was not in
sustained operation, whereas the other cases dealt with long-standing coordinated
operations of both tracts. In State Highway Commission v. Bloom and in Ives v.
Kansas Turnpike Authority, the language used by the courts varied greatly in describing "unity of use." However, the difference does not seem to be material or to
represent a real divergence of opinion. Neither is harsh to the claimant or to the
condemning authority. And each within its factual context seems correct.
"334 P-2d 399 (Kan. 1959).

State Highway Comm'n v. Bloom, 93 N.W.2d 572 (S.D. 1958).

31258 Fad 203 (gth Cir. z958).
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Furthermore, the pronouncement of the court in Cole Investment Co. that a mere
planned unity of use should not be considered does not seem erroneous. However,
the court seems to have erred in stating there was a second, purportedly independent
test-whether the market value of the remaining land has been diminished by the
taking. And the application by the court of its criteria to the facts of the case was
unduly harsh to the private owner. The Cole Investment Company not oily had
planned a well, but also it had commenced construction and experienced substantial
expenses in pursuit thereof prior to the time of the condemnation. On this basis, the
pronouncement by this Court of Appeals leaves much to be desired, since the owner
had suffered a recognizable loss.
All of these "severance" cases concerned rural tracts of land. The same problem,
however, does arise in an urban context. An interesting situation was presented
to the Supreme -Court of Pennsylvania in In re Elgart's Appeal"s with regard to
distinctly urban tracts of land. Two tracts of land in Philadelphia were contiguous
and fronted on a commercial street. One of them contained a multiple-family dwelling, while the other was unimproved. The undeveloped tract was condemned, and
the owner appealed from a decision of the trial court which denied him severance
damages for the remaining tract because there was no unity of use between the
two tracts. The court rejected the unity-of-use test for contiguous properties and
emphasized that "there is a recognized economical advantage in larger real estate
holdings. Substantial sums are paid by developers for the acquisition of larger plots
of land because the advantage of contiguous lots is always reflected by a larger
square foot value:" The contiguous plots involved in Elgart were in a commercially zoned area. Further, there was evidence offered at the trial that an
increase in size of such a tract increased value more than proportionately. Thus, it
seems that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court merely reflected obvious economic facts
of life when it permitted severance damages to the owner.30 Since urban property
was involved, it is not entirely clear that the rejection of the unity-of-use test would
be extended to contiguous rural tracts. The court made no explicit distinction along
these lines.
395 Pa. 343, 149 A2d 641 (19.5).
X49 A.2d at 643.

1 SId. at 347,

itmust be remembered that the unity-of-use doctrine is a "two-way street." Many times its invocation can only benefit'the private owner. However, a recent Delaware case shows the converse, and
its utilization was to the condemnee's marked disadvantage. In o.o89 of an Acre of Land v. State, 14s
A.2d 76 (Del. 1958), a portion" of a single tract of land fronting on a highway was condemned. On
that portion of the property not condemned, the owners operated a motel. The portion condemned was
undeveloped. At the trial, the private owners testified that they had not built on the condemned portion
because of a desire to utilize it in the future for commercial purposes such as a gasoline station. However, witnesses for the condemning authority testified that the condemned portion was not desirable
for commercial purposes because such use would have an adverse effect on the value of the uncondemned
portion as it was then being used. The private owners appealed from an award, their basis being a refusal
of the trial court to instruct the jury to consider the property as two distinct parcel-. The Supreme Court
of Delaware, in affirming the lower court, held that compensation could not be allowed the landowner on
any unimaginable, unnatural, or theoretical division of the property when it was not so divided.
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D. Impairment of Access
Again, there is a distinct absence of decisional uniformity as to whether severance
damages are permissible for an impairment of access. The problem usually arises
in this context: A commercial property fronts on a highway which either is changed
to a limited access highway or is left untouched, while parallel to it a new superhighway is constructed which diverts much of the traffic theretofore using the older
road. In both instances, the abutting land owner suffers through a reduction of
traffic. In recent years, the courts have tended to hold that an abutting land owner
does not have a property right or interest whereby the state is compelled to maintain
either a road or its traffic under a threat of damages. Nevertheless, the marked
divergence in judicial view is sharply demonstrated by two recent decisions, one in
Florida and the other in Kansas.
In Riddle v. State Highway Commission,3 the Supreme Court of Kansas was
faced with a claim for damages by a motel owner who abutted on a highway, the
traffic of which had been diverted to a new limited access highway. The court held
that, although an impairment of access is not an independent basis for assessing
damages, it is correct for a jury, in determining the value of property taken, to consider this element because it would affect the market value which the owner could
realize in a private sale. Since a portion of the motel owner's property was being
condemned, he was entitled to impairment of access damages.
In contrast, a Florida District Court of Appeal 2 has recently emphasized, when
considering whether a land owner, part of whose property has been condemned, is
entitled to compensation for traffic diversion, that the state has no duty to any person
to send public traffic past his door. Whether or not the abutting owner has any of
his land condemned for the new highway is immaterial. In no event should he be
entitled to impairment of access damages.
It is difficult to justify the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court of Kansas
between private owners whose land has been condemned and those whose land has
not been taken. A further question to be considered in this context is whether a
property owner, a portion of whose land is condemned, should be compensated
because the value of the remaining tract will be further reduced, since the project
to be constructed represents a "hazard."
Many recent court decisions have dealt vith claims for severance damages based
on the fear or anxiety induced by the nature of the public use for which a portion
of the land has been condemned. Such hazardous uses include gas transmission
lines,33 high tension lines,"' guided missile sites,3 5 and others.
The decided trend of the courts when dealing with this problem has been to
permit an award of severance damages. The reasoning of the Supreme Court of
11339

P.2d 301 (Kan. 1959)-

'Jahoda v. State Road Dep't, xo6 So.2d 870 (Fla. 1958).
a Northern Indiana Pub. Service Co. v. Darling, 154 N.E.2d 881 (Ind. 1958).
"Hicks v. United States, 266 Fad 5x 5 (6th Cir. x959).
"United States v. Chase, 260 F.2d 405 (id Cir. x958).
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Darling"8

best summarizes
Indiana in Northern Indiana Public Service Company v.
the judicial thinking on this point. The issue in that case concerned the fear engendered by the laying of a gas transmission line. Evidence was adduced at trial
that during the winter when the ground was frozen, if a leak in the gas line developed, it could travel through the ground and endanger the improvements on the
remaining tract. The court considered this fear judicially cognizable and compensable.
However, there is a pronounced judicial reluctance to permit severance damages
for an unproved or remote fear. The fact that the condemned property may at some
future time be used for a purpose causing anxiety is not relevant 7 Further, the
courts have usually hesitated to classify a project as a "hazard" without a clear
showing of immediate danger8 3
The policy behind the decisions dealing with fear and anxiety should apply with
iqual force to the impairment of access cases. Government should not be specially
burdened because of what it does in the public interest. Owners of property adjoining that taken and used by the government must normally accept the consequences
which are general to all. And if a general economic loss is suffered because of the
nature of the government improvement, no compensation should be awarded on
that account specially. When the nature of the project imposes a peculiar burden
upon the individual, compensation may be proper. But without a clear showing of
specific danger or harm-not merely a general economic disadvantage-compensation
should not be allowed.
E. Reimbursement of Attorney Fees
Without express legislative grants, attorney fees are made no part of an award
in condemnation proceedings. And only a few states have enacted statutory provisions permitting the reimbursement of attorney fees by the condemnor. 89 Within
the states permitting such awards, several problems have arisen. Should the determination of the amount of the award for attorney fees be a matter of law or of fact? 4°
Are expert witness fees to be included in the determination of the proper amount
of legal costs expended?"' Since these problems are not of broad scope, extensive
discussion here seems unwarranted.
However, the fact that some jurisdictions have enacted legislation providing
for the reimbursement of attorney fees brings to the fore once again the basic propriety of the inclusion of this cost as a part of the award in condemnation proceedings. Since we are here dealing with the issue of the propriety of an award intended
Be154 N.E.2d 88x (Ind. 1958).
37 United States v. 69.67 Acres of Land,

152 F. Supp. 441 (E.D.N.Y.

1957), aff'd

sub noma.United

States v. Chase, 26o F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Kooperman, 263 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1959)-

"In United States v. Chase, supra note 37, the court, while permitting damages because of a guided
missile site, restricted the damages so as not to include severance damages by reason of barracks to be
constructed on the land.
"See note 3 supra.

"Seban v. Dade County, 1o2 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1958).
"Re Petition of Detroit Edison Co., 87 N.W.ad 126 (Mich. x957).
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meaningfully to reimburse legal costs expended by private owners, it is necessary
to recognize that the granting thereof may materially increase the total cost of
acquisition.
To place our analysis in a better perspective, it seems best to utilize the hypothetical case. As will hereafter be discussed, condemning authorities rarely if ever
attempt to acquire property by court action without first directly negotiating with its
owner for amicable purchase. Assume that the X Redevelopment Authority desire$
to acquire ten square municipal blocks in X City for a project. The area sought is
residential and, for the most part, in a blighted condition. The Authority's appraisers
value the individual parcels, and then the owners are contacted. Some individualsforeseeing a losing and costly battle if they should protest-come to terms quickly.
However, the~fit is in tho Ate once the proposed project is made public. Local
real estate agents hastily contact many property owners and become their representatives. To a lesser extent, some individuals retain attorneys to represent them
in the negotiations..
Normally, whether the representative is an attorney or real estate agent, the fee
*arrangementis one of two kinds. First, it may be a percentage, say ten per cent, of
the final acquisition price, regardless of whether counsel is successful in obtaining
a more advantageous valuation. Secondly, it may be a percentage, normally as high
as fifty per cent, of the difference between the initial offering price and the final
acquisition price.
Because, however, X Redevelopment Authority is cognizant not only that amicable
purchase is a matter of bargaining, but also that many of the individuals will be
represented by persons earning a fee, it has considerable incentive to make its first offer
at less than the true valuation of the property. As a result, those condemnees who are
unrepresented are placed at a marked disadvantage. They are offered less than just
compensation for their property by the Authority, and they are without the tools to
represent themselves meaningfully. In this event, to obtain just compensation, they
must retain counsel. Even then, because of the counsel fee involved, either the
condemnee will receive a net award constituting less than just compensation or the
Authority will pay more than just compensation in its gross award.
The probable effect of permitting the recovery of legal costs is to foster litigation
in condemnation. However, one must recognize that even without reimbursement
of legal c6sts, substantial litigation does occur in the first instance. For example, in
Philadelphia, Boards of View determine value in the great majority of governmental
takings. The only new litigation that will be fostered is that which may occur
with those who would not have formally contested at the outset the condemnor's
amicable offer. However, continuation of litigation by the appeal of Boards of View
determinations is less likely when legal costs are unreimbursed. Absent such reimbursement, condemnee's counsel normally charge on a percentage basis. And
they are instrumental in terminating the judicial conflict, for litigation soon reachesto their pocketbooks, at least-the point of diminishing return.
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Therefore, upon analysis, it seems that a determination of the propriety of
reimbursing legal fees depends upon the relative balance between two contrasting
and yet crucial factors. The first is the importance to society of assuring that those
few individuals who normally would not obtain counsel will receive a net award
commensurate with just compensation. In contrast to this, is the importance of
coercive factors preventing unduly continued litigation. No attempt will be made
here to choose between these considerations.

INDIRECT OuTAys

In connection with a taking by eminent domain, the individual, both as the
representative for the general public and in his own right, can effectively question
not only the quantum of a basic condemnation award, but also the propriety
and suitability of a particular project. However, judicial condemnation procedures,
as they exist today, are best suited-and, indeed, designed--to provide a forum in
which a determination of the amount of compensation can be made. At best, they
are imperfect for other problems. There exist other forums, initially administrative
but with judicial review, in which the individual can challenge the propriety of the
taking or otherwise attack it.
However, condemning authorities are faced with a major problem. The traditional condemnation procedures can increase the cost of a project appreciably through
delay and increased legal costs. Remedial legislation, in some instances, is the only
solution. But in others, those where the responsibility rests with the judiciary, what
is needed, is a reappraisal by the courts of their role. Our task in this article is not
to review the entire field. Rather, it is to analyze a few special problems with which
many recent decisions have been concerned.
A. Prior Negotiations
It is only natural that condemning authorities should normally attempt to acquire
the property involved through direct negotiations. Obviation of lengthy and costly
judicial condemnation proceedings is obviously beneficial to all concerned. Nevertheless, it sometimes occurs that a condemning authority can work most efficiently if
it utilizes the judicial process without negotiating for amicable purchase. Some
states, however, have enacted legislation requiring the condemning authority to
negotiate a purchase before instituting condemnation proceedings. In these jurisdictions, a problem arises-whether negotiations for purchase are an inflexible prerequisite to condemnation.
In Lookholder v. Zeigler,"' the Supreme Court of Michigan was confronted
with legislation requiring negotiations not only with property owners, but also with
lessees. The State Highway Commission, after determining the advisability of new
construction, had negotiated with an owner offering him a price which included the

as354 Mich.

28, 91 N.W.2d 834 (1958).

too
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value of the leasehold. However, no negotiations were attempted with his lessees,
the justification of this omission being the need for summary acquisitive action and
the belief that the lessees could then negotiate with the owner for an amicable settlement. On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the condemnation proceedings were invalid.
Most leases contain a provision that, in the event of condemnation, no liability in
favor of the lessee shall exist against the lessor. Further, what benefits one will not
always benefit the other. Indeed, upon the assumption that each has a distinct property interest, the lessor would be in the fortuitous position of being able to sacrifice
the lessee for his own (lessor's) advantage. Therefore, for the lessee to be dependent on the lessor in regard to negotiating is most inadequate. The tenant
should be allowed to negotiate with, and to proceed directly against, the condemning
authority. For this reason, the interpretation by the Supreme Court of Michigan
that the state's prior negotiations requirement includes negotiations with a lessee
seems justified.
B. Right to Appeal Condemnation Awards
Several recent decisions concern themselves with the basic, and as yet unsettled,
question of the effect that payment of a preliminary condemnation award should
have on the right of either the condemning authority or the condemnee to appeal.
This problem has, to some degree, been magnified by the utilization of quick-taking
procedures, where the condemning authority has the right to take immediate possession of land upon deposit in court of estimated damages. -Under this procedure, the
condemnee has a fund deposited in court by the condemnor which may be readily
available to him.
The Supreme Court of Missouri in a recent case 4' determined the proper scope
of appeal by a condemnee who had accepted the initial condemnation award. The
State Highway Commission had condemned an entire parcel of land in connection
with road construction. The lower court awarded damages, which were paid into
court and subsequently withdrawn by the condemnee. Thereafter, on appeal, the
owner challenged the validity of the condemnation proceedings as a whole. The
court held that since the land owner had accepted the award, he was estopped from
questioning any matters except those relating to the amount of damages.
On the other hand, Woodside v. City of Atlanta" was concerned with what,
if any, prerequisites existed to the condemning authority's right to prosecute an
appeal from an allegedly excessive condemnation award by its assessors. The
Georgia Supreme Court held that a tender of payment to the condemnees or a
deposit in court was a mandatory prerequisite to the condemnor's right to appeal.
The condemning authority could not refuse to pay the amount awarded by the
assessors and at the same time insist upon its right to take the property.
One step removed from the Woodside decision are recent rulings by the Supreme
"State v. Howald, 315 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. 1958).

44 214 Ga. 75, 103 S.E.2d xo8 (1958).
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Courts of Arizona and Nevada, both of which concern the question of whether the
condemning authority can appeal a jury determination of damages in a condemnation suit, even though it took possession and paid the amount of the judgment.
In State v. lay Six Cattle Company," the condemning authority had taken posses-

sion of land pursuant to a quick-taking statute under which it could apply for
immediate possession after a hearing on necessity and probable damages. Upon a
court deposit of double the probable damages, possession was awarded. Subsequently,
a jury trial was conducted on the issue of damages and a judgment entered, which
the state paid into court. Contending that the award was excessive, the condemnor
filed its notice of appeal. Despite this appeal, the trial court permitted the condemnees to withdraw the deposit in full satisfaction of the judgment. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Arizona refused to sanction the condemnees' contention that
the state, by tendering the judgment into court and taking possession of the land,
waived its rights to appeal. The court reasoned that to hold that payment constituted
a waiver would mean, in effect, that, whenever a condemning authority sought use of
property before the conclusion of an appeal, the condemnee would gain a fixed right
to a possibly unjust and excessive award.
In State v. Second Judicial District Court,"' unlike Jay Six Cattle Company, the

condemning authority, being bound by a similar statute, contended at trial that it
should not be required to deposit the amount of compensation adjudged if it took an
appeal. The condemning authority took the position that to do so would waive its
right of appeal if the condemnee withdrew the deposit in satisfaction of the judgment.
The Supreme Court of Nevada, citing Jay Six Cattle Company, ruled, however, that
its quick-taking statute had a similar purport to the Arizona statute with regard to
preservation of the condemning authority's right to appeal. Therefore, the condemnor would not be prejudiced by tender of the amount of the judgment awarded
by the trial court. The court held that such a tender is a prerequisite to the condemning authority's right to appeal on the question of damages. Of course, as the
opinion acknowledges, the victory on appeal may be less meaningful if the property
owner has squandered the award in the interval.
Our concern is not with the situation where a condemning authority has initially
determined property valuation for the purpose of amicable negotiations with the
condemnee. Instead, it is with the situation where, negotiated purchase failing, the
initial determination of proper compensation is accomplished by independent bodies
distinct in function and control from condemnors.' At this point, both parties
should be afforded the right to question the award further.
However, mere recognition that government, as well as the individual, has the
right to appeal does not resolve the complicated question whether the condemning
authority should lose this right by taking possession or by provisionally paying the
" 85 Ariz. 220, 335 P.2d 799 (1959).
337 P.2d 274 (Nev. 1959).
"E.g., Boards of View appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction in Pennsylvania.
supra.
46

See note 18
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amount of the award, or whether the condemnee forsakes all by accepting the initial
award. The condemnee may have lost possession of his property. Without at least
receipt of provisional compensation, his burden is extreme. Similarly, to the condemning authority, immediate possession ofttimes is crucial. Delay may not only
drastically increase costs, but may prove an insurmountable obstacle to the success of
many governmental projects.
Quick-taking statutes normally require a deposit with the court. Similarly, in
their absence, the condemnor may be required to pay the amount of the initial award
to the condemnee in order to take immediate possession. It is difficult to justify withdrawing the condemnor's right to appeal the compensation award because of its
practical necessity for immediate possession. The condemnee suffers no harm, for
he has access to the funds so deposited under quick-taking statutes, or to the judgment in traditional condemnation proceedings. Even if, under the applicable procedure, the condemnee cannot obtain payment of the initial award prior to disposition of an appeal, no basis exists to place the condemnor in the dilemma of either
paying an excessive award or foregoing its right to immediate possession. Of course,
in the latter instance, the condemnee is deprived of both his property and immediate
compensation, but the fault lies not with the condemning authority.
The Woodside case,4" which ruled that a tender of payment to the condemnees
or a deposit in court was a mandatory prerequisite to the condemnor's right of appeal,
creates special problems. There the initial award was made by three assessors, rather
than by a jury.
To require deposit of an award by the condemnor at this early a stage in the
proceedings-with the concomitant possibility that the money may be drawn down
and squandered-may give too much weight to a relatively uninformed, and sometimes ill-considered, determination made without a judge's direct supervision. Perhaps, too, the funds of the condemnor might thereby be unduly tied up. Contrariwise, a ruling that a condemnor need never deposit money in court until final
determination of appropriate compensation, while extremely favorable to public
progress, unduly imposes upon the individual. A proper line of demarcation, therefore, seems to be at the point where the initial jury determination of compensation is
made, for it is at this point that we first have a determining body which most representatively reflects individual interests and is operating fully within a framework of
procedural safeguards.
In State v. Howald,4" the Supreme Court of Missouri determined that receipt
of compensation by the condemnee forecloses his right to contest other than the
quantum of the award. No matter if the issue is the broad constitutionality of the
taking, its propriety, or the amount of compensation. The condemnee is in the same
position, for he has been deprived of possession of his property. Of course, it might
have been possible for the condemnee to contest other than the amount of condemna" See nOte 44 supra.
"See nOte 43 supra.
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tion during prior proceedings.5 However, the failure of the condemnee to raise
such a question at that point should not now foreclose him, for as noted hereafter
in this article, individuals have but a tenuous right to question at the administrative
level either the constitutionality of a particular project or its propriety. Receipt of
compensation should not be determinative of the issues that the condemnee can raise
in protest, certainly if he demonstrates his willingness and ability to repay the money
in the event of a favorable decision.
C. Finality of Agency Determinations
Most legislatures have not specified either the scope or the manner in which a
court may review agency determinations. In some jurisdictions, administrative procedure acts govern the manner in which the agency makes its determinations and
the manner of individual protests. Of course, where there is specific legislation or an
applicable procedure act, many problems are resolved. However, typical of the situation in a majority of states is that which arose in Connecticut. In Bahr Corporation
v. O'Brion,5' a redevelopment agency had decided after public hearings to condemn
land including that which was owned by the plaintiff, who sought to enjoin action by
the agency to take his land. The land owner protested the agency's decision as being
unreasonable, an abuse of power, and a taking of property for a private use rather
than a public one. The Connecticut Redevelopment Act did not specifically provide
the scope of review for agency actions. Further, neither the state administrative procedure act nor its rules of court specified the applicable procedure and scope of
review. On appeal, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to a judicial review
whether the agency determination was unreasonable, in bad faith, or an abuse of its
power. He was not required to allege or prove any fraud by members of the
agency.
On the surface, it might appear that no justification can be advanced for this
rulingP2 Its obvious result is a wasteful delay of agency action. Yet, too often
existing administrative procedures do not adequately heed individual interests; and
property owners are not afforded a fair opportunity to challenge the propriety of a
proposed project. The right to appear at a public hearing conducted by the agency
is often futile, for the property owner does not have adequate time to prepare his
case. What is really needed is an adequate administrative procedure. For instance,
the local agency should be required to make specific findings to be incorporated in the
record; all information presented at the public hearings and all other factors which
the agency has considered in making its decision that an area is blighted and requires
renewal should be presented to the public. Furthermore, adequate time should be
afforded property owners so that they may prepare their cases. Thus, the Bahr de-

le See

note and text at note 51 infra.

sI 146 Conn. 237, 149 A.ad 691 (1959).
"See

(7959).

Note, Judicial Review of Urban Redevelopment Agency Determinations, 69 YALE L. 1. 321
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cision must be read against a background of legislative failure in Connecticut to

provide sufficient administrative safeguards.
CONCLUSION

No attempt has here been made to set forth all the problems that exist in the field
of eminent domain. Such a task is, indeed, impossible of accomplishment in other
than a complete text-adequate today but, nevertheless, obsolete tomorrow. However, the problems touched upon typify some of the areas in which corrective action
by courts and legislatures is necessary. Continued delay in taking such corrective
action will threaten many individual governmental projects with failure. Conversely,
intelligent and timely remedial action will further the cause of dynamic-and good
-government.

